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TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
THE GOVERNMENT OF Uganda has vigorously pursued a
policy of decentralisation, since 1993, that involves the
devolution of specified powers and responsibilities from
the centre to local governments. The responsibilities that
had hitherto been the domain of central government,
affected the pace and quality of service delivery for both
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) and planning,
implementation and management of piped urban water
supplies outside the towns run by the National Water and
Sewerage Corporation (NWSC).
The regulatory framework for decentralised delivery of
Rural Water Supply (RWS) is provided for in the Local
Government Act (LGA 1997) that provides for the contin-
ued process of decentralisation. The powers, responsibili-
ties, functions, funds and services from the central govern-
ment are devolved and transferred to Local Governments in
order to increase local democratic control and participa-
tion in decision making, and to mobilise support for a
development that is relevant to local needs. Under the LGA
1997:
• District, Municipal, Sub-county and Division Councils
are corporate bodies.
• District administrations are responsible for the plan-
ning, development, rehabilitation and maintenance of
the rural water and sanitation systems in liaison with
the Ministry responsible for water.
• District administrations are entitled to funding from the
central government in form of conditional, uncondi-
tional and equalisation grants.
• The District Administration can contract out public
services including water and sanitation to the private
sector.
• The central government is charged with the responsi-
bilities of policy making, coordination, technical guid-
ance, support supervision, inspection, monitoring and
providing specialised training.
The lead central government agency for RWS is the
Directorate of Water Development (DWD) under the Min-
istry of Water, Lands and Environment (MWLE). The
Directorate has the mandate for the overall water resources
management and development, and planning and supervi-
sion of rural water and sanitation programmes in liaison
with relevant line ministries, development partners and
stakeholders.
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation sub-sector cov-
ers 85% of the population of Uganda whose scattered
homesteads are largely served through communal point
water sources such as protected springs, boreholes, shallow
wells and gravity scheme standposts.
At present about 55% of the rural population have access
to safe water supply and 52% to basic sanitation facilities.
These figures however, mask considerable disparity be-
tween and within districts and do not consider the function-
ality of water sources. The Government of Uganda has
responded to the poor access to basic water and sanitation
services by including investment in the sector as a key
component of the Poverty Eradication Action Programme
(PEAP). The water sector will thus benefit from additional
funding under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative.  According to the RWSS Investment Plan – 2001;
the total investment for RWSS sub-sector, is estimated at
US$ 910 million over the period 2001 – 2015 in order to
achieve 95 – 100% coverage.
Effective from 2000/2001 Financial Year (FY), RWS
sub-sector development budget was disbursed directly to
local governments as conditional grants to finance the
District Water and Sanitation Development Conditional
Grants (DWSDCG) Programme. The districts utilise and
account for quarterly releases of funds from the centre
before accessing subsequent releases. This approach how-
ever, seems to place a lot of emphasis on construction of
new facilities without devoting commensurate resources to
the operation and maintenance of the installed facilities.
DWSDCG  programme structure
The District Coordination Committees compile workplans
and budgets, with support from the TSU. TSUs are regionally
based for a group of (5-6)districts. The workplans are then
sent to DWD for final compilation, by the programme
secretariat, and the submitted to Ministry Finance for
funding. The funds are released directly to district ac-
counts.
Transitional arrangements
One of the major findings of the Rural Water and sanitation
sub-sector reform study in year 2000 was that many
districts lacked the capacity to implement an effective water
and sanitation programme in their present state, and needed
strong support for institutional and organisational devel-
opment and capacity building. In order to address the
capacity gaps in Districts, the Ministry of Water, Lands and
Environment set up Technical Support Units (TSU) to
provide the needed technical and management backup
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Figure 1. Management structure of DWSDCG programme
PS/MWLE
Programme Secretariat
Director/DWD
Senior Engineer (DWD) /
Technical Support Units TSU
(8No.)
Chief Administrative Officer/
District   (45Nos.)
District Coordination 
Committee(s)
Technical Committee(s)
IMSC
Focal Point /Institution Functional Committee
Key:
MWLE  Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment
DWD  Directorate of Water Development
IMSC  Inter Ministerial Steering Committee
support to districts for 3-5 years. TSUs are not regional
government structures; they are just a deconcentration of
DWD for technical assistance to districts.
The TSUs were initially resisted by some districts which
argued that TSUs were usurping powers  / undermining the
autonomy of District local governments. The TSUs how-
ever have now been appreciated by all Districts as necessary
partners in:
• Effective capacity development of districts for effective
implementation of sector programmes.
• Effective deconcentration of DWD and thus providing
districts with the necessary backup technical assistance
within easy reach.
• Providing the necessary quality assurance of the facili-
ties constructed with private sector participation and
making input into district plans before submission to
the centre for funding.
Key challenges to delivery of services
Private sector participation
• The changing roles of key actors (as authority and
responsibility are transferred from central ministries to
district authorities, and implementation is no longer
performed by public sector, but rather by the private
sector under the supervision of the public sector),
carries a number of implications to be dealt with. The
TSUs have made some headway in supporting districts
with tender documents for procurement of contractors
for low cost technologies like springs, shallow wells and
GFS, and instruments of supervising the private sector
but again a lot remains to be done in re-orienting staff
in the new district water office to take on their new roles
fully.
• As part of the decentralisation-privatisation process,
the market for services being contracted out is increas-
ing. A severe-lag in the private sector’s capacity to
provide quality services is consistently reported in some
districts, especially the remote boarder districts with
poor infrastructure.
Procurement
• Districts’ capacities to tender for and procure services,
plus supervise contractors, still need considerable
strengthening. Currently, DWD undertakes, centrally,
the bulk procurement of consultancy services for Rural
Growth Centres and their contractors to ensure uni-
formity in approach and sharing of experiences be-
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tween districts. It is hoped that this function will be
transferred to the District Water Office after about
5years, when districts will have developed the necessary
capacity.
• Individual district procurement of some works and
services like, borehole drilling, leads to diseconomies of
scale and increased costs. Bulk procurement of such
works by the centre would secure cost savings but under
decentralisation, this is  seen as usurping the roles of a
decentralised local government and thus resisted.
Decentralisation
• Adequate authority and budgets have not yet been
devolved down to lower levels of local government
(sub-counties) to carry out their roles and responsibili-
ties in the manner envisioned; Most of the funds are still
sent from the centre to districts as conditional grants.
The districts argue that conditionalising most of the
grants undermines the local governments financial au-
tonomy. In response the central government feels that
conditionalising grants is a way of supporting govern-
ance and decentralisation; government would continue
to intervene to ensure basic minimum delivery of serv-
ices to the people. (The intention is that capital develop-
ment budget will eventually be decentralised and the
grants made unconditional).
• Districts closer to larger towns, with more resources
and better organisation, often attract and benefit from
assistance than those with less resources and not well
organised, which may be unfair in terms of inequity
reduction. The efforts by DWD to establish technical
support units, regionally based for a group of districts,
to offer more technical support and guidance to districts
is a move in the right direction and will go along way to
reducing inequality in support to districts. However,
much remains to be done in supporting the activities of
TSUs countrywide.
• The Local Government Act (1997) establishes District
Tender Boards that are charged with award of tenders
to the private firms. Most of the districts consistently
submit reports on political interference in the award of
contracts leading, in some cases, to poor quality of
facilities constructed.
Sustainability of facilities installed
The unit costs for implementation of the programme are
tagged to physical outputs and thus there is a general
imbalance between service delivery and capacity building
for long-term sustainability of facilities. The software as-
pects of the programme are not adequately funded. This
would seem to create a dependence culture of communities
on central government for maintenance of facilities.
The conditionality of return of all unused funds back to
the centre at the end of each Financial Year, encourages the
district partners to build water facilities as quickly as
possible. So there is a disincentive for district implementers
to undertake community mobilisation and capacity build-
ing before construction. This seriously undermines the
community’s sense of ownership and ability to sustainably
manage the facilities. These rules need to be changed.
Conclusions/recommendations
1. The effectiveness of investments in rural water supply,
under decentralisation, should not be judged purely in
terms of increase in safe water coverage because to
achieve long-term sustainability of the facilities con
structed, some of the funds have to be invested in
aspects of training, capacity building for staff and
WSCs, orientation of districts staff into their new roles,
management of contracts and sensitisation of district
and other lower local government councils. These
aspects do not result in physical increase in safe water
coverage but are key to the success of the
decentralisation.
2. Decentralisation is more likely to succeed if flexibility is
built into it; for instance, when districts are allowed to
go into partnerships with competent NGOs for
implementation of some activities where savings can be
made. This flexibility enables key innovative approaches
to be tested and results shared to improve
implementation.
3. Decentralisation presents an opportunity for major
sector reforms and requires patience, political support
and an interactive approach between the centre and
local governments to resolve the issues that inevitably
arise during implementation.
4. Base the support to the process of decentralisation on
long-term (10 – 15year) and strategic reforms and
investment plans to enable the process and systems to
evolve and be fairly judged.
5. Private sector participation in construction of facilities
is pursued on the assumption that it is more efficient
than public sector and that eventually unit costs for
delivery of services would be reduced. The overall
management of contracts is however, critical to the
realisation of this intention/objective; and thus the need
to offer backup support and training to district / local
government staff in the management of contracts.
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